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Supreme Court Docket No. 44026 
Ada County No. CV-OC-2014-17003 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County 
Honorable D. Duff McKee, District Judge presiding 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
CATHERINE A. FREEMAN 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
Email: civilpafiles@adaweb.net 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JOSEPH C. MILLER 
MAUK MILLER HAWKINS, LLC 
515 S. 6th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-8787 
Facsimile: (208) 287-8788 
Email: joe@idahojustice.com 
Attorney for Claimant-Respondent 
11 
L ST AND ARD OF REVIEW .. ... ........................ ....... ..... ............................ .. ..... ... ....... 1 
II. ARGUMENT ....... ........... ............... .... ... ......... ........ ......................... .................. ........ 1 
A. The District Court Misapplied the Preponderance Standard ................................ 1 
B. Appellant's Evidence Shows that the Defendant Property 
is Subject to Forfeiture ............................................................................................... 3 
III. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 7 
Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000) ............................ l 
Oxley v. Med. Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 80 P.3d 1077 (2003) .............................. 2 
People v. $180,975 in United States Currency (In re Forfeiture o/$180,975), 
4 78 Mich. 444, 734 N. W.2d 489 (2007) ............................................................................... 4 
United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy 
Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 3 
Authorities 
Idaho Code § 37-2744 ................................................................................................................. 1 
11 
An appellate court "exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law"; 
the court may therefore "substitute its view for that of the district court on a legal issue." Idaho 
Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743, 9 P.3d 1204, 1209 (2000). Respondent 
asserts that the reviewing court may overturn a district court's "findings and judgment" only if 
they are "clearly erroneous." Claimant-Respondent's Brief, p. 8. However, only findings of fact 
are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard; the court may freely review questions of law. 
Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho at 743, 9P.3d at 1209. Here, Appellant does not appeal any findings 
of fact. 1 Instead, Appellant requests this Court's review of the district court's application of the 
law, and the Court therefore exercises free review. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Misapplied the Preponderance Standard. 
As noted by both parties, the standard of proof in a forfeiture proceeding is 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 37-2744. This requires a plaintiff to show that the 
Defendant Property was, more likely than not, used or intended for use in connection with illegal 
1 Though a ruling of involuntary dismissal under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) requires a 
district court to enter findings of fact, the court failed to do so here. Respondent asserts that 
Appellant does not argue that the findings of fact are erroneous because "there is no erroneous 
argument to be made." Claimant-Respondent's Brief, p. 10. However, no findings of fact exist in 
this case; Appellant omits this argument because it instead questions the district court's 
application of law. 
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review of the record here shows misapplication of the standard. 
Respondent appears to offer one direct response to Appellant's argument that the district 
court applied the wrong standard: the court stated it used the preponderance burden. Tr. p. 100, 
LL. 18-25, p. 101, LL. 1-3. He argues that the Appellant's reliance on the district court's words 
is therefore misguided and that Appellant's citations to the court's explanation of its ruling is an 
attempt to "assume what was in the court's mind." Claimant-Respondent's Brief, p. 8. However, 
to rely on the court's statement that it applied the preponderance standard alone is to elevate 
form over substance - though the standard was correctly titled, it was misapplied. The court's 
explanation of its ruling exposes several critical flaws. For example, as discussed in the 
Appellant's Brief, the court stated that Appellant's burden was "almost insurmountable" because 
the Appellant sought money from a bank account. Tr. p. 95, LL. 24-25, p. 96, LL. 1-3. "More 
likely than not" is not comparable to "almost insurmountable." The court's explanation of its 
ruling revealed a troublesome interpretation of preponderance and a mistakenly heightened 
burden on Appellant. 
Appellant set forth two propositions in its initial briefing which depict the district court's 
misapplication in more detail. Claimant-Respondent has not addressed either. First, the district 
court required the Appellant to trace funds in an exact, "dollar in," "dollar out" manner. Tr. p. 
97, LL. 19-22. Second, the court required Appellant to disprove all potential legitimate sources 
of income. Tr. p. 100, LL. 1-3. There is not Idaho statutory or decisional law that supports the 
district court's broad application of the standard in requiring the above. The law merely requires 
s 
was more 
illegal drug activity. Further, nationally, courts have "eschew[ed] clinical detachment and 
endors[ ed] a common sense view to the realities of normal life applied to the totality of the 
circumstances." US. v. Funds in the Amount nf Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars 
($30,670.00), 403 FJd 448,469 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The law does not support the 
district court's broad application of the preponderance standard, and Respondent has offered 
nothing to defend these errors. 
Aside from citing the district court's statement that it was applying the preponderance 
standard, Respondent offers two arguments which he claims support the court's application of 
the standard: (1) that the court appropriately examined the evidence at trial and (2) that the court 
correctly applied the substantial evidence test. These arguments do not refute Appellant's 
position. As mentioned above, Appellant does not appeal findings of fact in this case; rather, 
Appellant disputes the district court's application of law to those facts. Instead, these arguments 
appear to be an attempt to bolster Respondent's primary argument in response, which questions 
the sufficiency of Appellant's evidence. However, a review of the evidence shows that there was 
indeed sufficient evidence to shift the burden to Respondent and even further, to subject 
Defendant Property to forfeiture. 
B. Appellant's Evidence Shows that the Defendant Property is Subject to Forfeiture 
Applying the correct standard, the evidence shows that Defendant Property is subject to 
forfeiture. As aforementioned, courts have "endors[ ed] a common sense view to the realities of 
normal life applied to the totality of the circumstances." Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand 
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975 in US. Currency, 478 Mich. 444, 471, 734 489, 504 (2007). Respondent 
attempts to discount the evidence on the record piece by piece2; however, the totality of the 
evidence tl1rough the common sense lens noted above shows that Appellant met its burden. 
The evidence on the record shows that Respondent is a convicted methamphetamine 
trafficker. Ex. 1. At the time of his arrest, he was in possession of almost a pound of 
methamphetamine, five (5) digital scales, almost forty (40) smoking devices, and $12,794.00. Tr. 
p. 25, LL. 14-19, p. 26, LL. 1-8, Ex. 1, Cr. p. 106-07. This is not the way a recreational 
methamphetamine user travels. Common sense suggests that Respondent was instead 
transporting drugs for sale at the time of his arrest. 3 
In addition, the evidence also shows that Respondent was unemployed at the time of his 
arrest. Specifically, Respondent informed Detective Roberson on the date of his arrest that he 
was unemployed and looking for work. Tr. p. 34, LL. 13-25, p. 35, LL. 1-5. In his brief, 
Respondent appears to intimate evidence to the contrary, which is not on the record. For 
example, Respondent states that "Roberson did not ask [Respondent] how long he'd been 
2 The Claimant-Respondent's Brief attacks individual pieces of evidence, almost summarily 
stating that facts do not exist to support Appellant's argument on each. It is important to note that 
each of Appellant's factual references is accompanied by citation to the record. 
3 Respondent's Brief appears to argue that Appellant is required to prove that Respondent was 
not only trafficking drugs but also transporting them for sale. Appellant has already proven a 
violation of the Idaho Controlled Substances Act, as required by the Act; the Judgment of 
Conviction outlining his Trafficking conviction was admitted as an exhibit in this case. Ex. 1. At 
this point, Appellant need only show that more likely than not the money in Respondent's bank 
account was derived from methamphetamine sales. The fact that Respondent was traveling 
across state lines with nearly a pound of methamphetamine, almost $13,000, and five digital 
scales suggests that Respondent was, in fact, transporting controlled substances for sale. 
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saved the bank, whether he was collecting unemployment, whether he had any other sources 
of income, etc. Even after seizing the money in the bank, Roberson did not investigate the 
unemployment issue." Claimant-Respondent's Brief p. 9 & 11. None of these claims are 
evidenced in the record, and Claimant-Respondent's Brief can offer no citations. The only 
evidence admitted and in front of the district judge shows that Respondent was unemployed. 
Despite his unemployment, Respondent deposited over $37,000 in the two months 
preceding his arrest. Ex. 4, pp. 83 & 95. The fact that Respondent was an unemployed 
methamphetamine trafficker who was depositing over $37,000 in less than two months (despite 
his unemployment) again suggests that the money in his bank account was more likely than not 
from methamphetamine sales. The bank records also show that each of his large deposits 
occurred within eight days following a series of out-of-state purchases.4 Id. Additionally, the 
bank records admitted into evidence show that Respondent made at least six trips to California, 
Utah, and Nevada in the month and a half prior to his arrest and that many of his expenditures 
were for gas and lodging. Ex. 4, pp. 80-81, 84-85, & 94-95. This is not common bank activity for 
a typical traveler. 
Detective Roberson had received information that Respondent met with his source of 
methamphetamine supply in Utah on August 20, 2014. Tr. p. 56, LL. 1-3. In fact, Respondent's 
4 Respondent made out-of-state purchases in Colorado and Utah on July 7, 2014 and a deposit of 
$26,620.48 on July 15, 2014; out-of-state purchases in Nevada and California from August 7 to 
11, 2014 and a deposit of $4,650.00 on August 13, 2014; out-of-state purchases in Nevada and 
California from August 13 to 14, 2014 and deposits equaling $6,450.00 on August 18, 2014. Ex. 
4, pp. 80-81, 84-85, & 94-95. 
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same was 
Boise with nearly a pound of methamphetamine in car. 4, p. 95. the 
evidence admitted shows that Respondent used money from the Defendant Property bank 
account to fuel his vehicle in transporting metha..mphetamine across state lines. Additionally, 
Detective Roberson testified that Respondent was traveling in a corridor that is known for drug 
trafficking at the time of his arrest; Respondent was found in the corridor with a large amount of 
cash and methamphetamine in his possession. Tr. p. 51, LL. 5-15, p. 52, LL. 3-8. 
Additionally, while being booked into the Ada County Jail, Respondent asked two 
individuals outside of the jail to withdraw Defendant Property from his bank account in order to 
evade police. He stated, "Just get it out of the bank for now [ ... ] We'll worry about where it 
goes. [ ... ] [T]ransfer them into someone else's bank account. .. or they're going to confiscate 
it[.]" Ex. 3, p. 18, LL. 1-8. Again, courts endorse a common sense approach this is not the way 
an individual with a bank account of legitimate funds would act. 
The Respondent asks that this court review the evidence on a piece by piece basis. 
However, the evidence as a whole, viewed through a lens of common sense, shows that 
Defendant Property was used and intended for use in connection with the illegal transport of 
methamphetamine. The totality of the evidence at hand shows that Mr. DeMint' s trafficking 
methamphetamine. Mr. DeMint deposited a large amount of money in his bank account from the 
sales of methamphetamine, and his bank records show purchases to fund his trafficking 
excursions. The money in Mr. DeMint' s bank account was used and intended for use in 




The district court improperly held Appellant to a standard that was "almost 
insurmountable," and which reflects misapplication of the preponderance standard. Additionally, 
the evidence at hand shows that Defendant Property is subject to forfeiture under the Idaho 
Controlled Substances Act. 
Therefore, based on the above, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's ruling and remand for a trial under the proper standard. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
' 
By: 
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